Ioana Hincu

Europa si Islamul. Diferente.

In Solutii on Septembrie 6, 2015 at 6:21 pm

In continuarea acestor idei, desprinse din realitati:

Refugiatii. Solutii exista, dar sunt Incorecte Politic: https://ihincu.wordpress.com/2015/09/03/refugiatii-solutii-exista-dar-sunt-incorecte-politic/

Incorect politic despre terorism si religie: https://ihincu.wordpress.com/2015/08/29/sa-intelegem-religia-pacii-si-jihadul-v-incorect-politic-despre-terorism-si-religie/

Azi, in ciclul GOOD READS, sau, sa spunem, BIBLIOGRAFIA BUNULUI SIMT si anti-monopolul gandirii (parafrazandu-l pe Alexandru Hancu si titlul unui articol al sau mai vechi, il aveti aici, http://www.kmkz.ro/opinii/editorial/bibliografia-bunului-simt/)

ne oprim asupra altui autor de referinta.

Fiind duminica, si notand ce nivel submediocru are la noi dezbaterea cauzata de problema imigratiei ilegale islamice (zisa si problema “refugiatilor”), inclusiv in randul elitelor noastre politice, academice, intelectuale, intervin cu o recomandare de lectura si reflectie. Limpezeste si structureaza criteriile dezbaterii.

David Landes (1924-2013) istoric, specialitatea istorie economica, Harvard University (si nu numai; aveti internet, aveti google, cititi singuri mai multe despre cine a fost si cu ce s-a ocupat).

In 1998, David Landes publica The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, comparand istoria economica a diferitelor regiuni ale lumii – SUA, Europa, Japonia, China, lumea araba, America latina – din antichitate si pana in zilele noastre. Istoria ideilor, conceptelor, curentelor de gandire politice, morale, religioase (interdependente in mod inevitabil), ca sursa a felului in care s-au asezat, complet diferit, relatiile economice in aceste civilizatii.

In capitolul 3, intitulat European Exceptionalism: a different path, Landes analizeaza multiplele determinisme ale caii europene si occidentale, unice, diferite in raport de oricare alta regiune a lumii. Calea (lunga si grea) a prosperitatii si libertatii individuale, pe care Europa si Occidentul crestin au apucat-o. Cale imprevizibila pentru multi acum 1000 de ani, cand Europa evului mediu – “mediu” pt ca s-a aflat la mijloc, intre caderea Imperiului Roman si Renastere – era extrem de fragmentata politico-administrativ si strabatuta de valurile migratiilor barbare.

Redam cateva fragmente relevante in raport de problemele actuale:

“the very notion of economic development was a Western invention. Aristocratic (despotic) empires were characteristically squeeze operations: when the elites wanted more, they did not think in terms of gains in productivity.[…]They simply pressed (and opressed) harder, and usually found some hidden juice. Sometimes they miscalculated and squeezed too hard, and that could mean flight, riot, and opportunities for rebellion. These autocracies, though defined as divine, were not immortal. Meanwhile only societies with room for multiple initiatives, from below more than from above, could think in terms of growing pie.

The ancient Greeks distinguished between free and unfree, not so much in terms of material benefits (there were not particulary keen on economic enterprise, which they associated with metics and other crass people), or even in terms of the advantages of their own system, as of the wrongness of the other, which they saw as tyranny. And yet, the Greeks succumbed to despotism, most spectacularly in the empire created by Alexander and ruled by Asian and Egyptian successors; and later the Romans went the same way, sliding all too easily into tyrannical autocracy. In final form, the classical Mediterranean world came to resemble politically the civilizations to the east – a powerful and small elite surrounded by clients, servants, and slaves, and headed by an autocrat. But only resembled. Dissenters knew this was wrong, spoke up and wrote, and suffered for their presumption. The republican ideal died hard.

Meanwhile, property rights had to be rediscovered and reasserted after the fall of Rome. This world, which we know as medieval – the time between – was a transitional society, an amalgam of classical legacy, Germanic tribal laws and customs, and what we now call the Judaic-Christian tradition. All of these provided support for institutions of private property. […]

Tensions and ambiguities, then. But what mattered in the long run were the constraints imposed by political fragmentation and general insecurity. In the centuries that followef the end of empire, the arm of authority was short. Power derived in principle from the freely consented allegiance of the group or an elite within it and was correspondigly limited […]

Some did seek to restore the empire that had been. The dream of Rome reborn never died. Had they succeeded, one might have expected a revival of arbitrary despotism. But such efforts broke down […]

In this context, private property was what could be held and defended. Sometimes it was seized by force, just as today someone might be mugged and robbed. But the principle never died: property was a right, and confiscation, no more than plunder, could not change that.

THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WENT BACK TO BIBLICAL TIMES AND WAS TRANSMITTED AND TRANSFORMED BY CHRISTIAN TEACHING. The Hebrew hostility to autocracy, even their own, was formed in Egypt and the desert […] Let me cite two examples, where the response to popular initiative is directly linked to the sanctity of possessions. When the priest Korach leads a revolt against Moses in the desert, Moses defends himself against charges of usurpation by saying, “I have not taken one ass from them, nor have I wronged any of them”(Numbers 16:15) Similarly, when the Israelites, now established in the Land, call for a king, the prophet Samuel grants their wish but warns them of the consequences: a king, he tells them, will not be like him. “Whose ox have I taken, or whose ass have I taken?” ( I Samuel 12:3)

This tradition, which set the Israelites apart from any of the kingdoms around and surely did much to earn them the hostility of nearby rulers – who needed such trouble makers? – tended to get lost in Christianity when that community of faith became a church, especially once that Church became the official, privileged religion of an autocratic empire. One cannot well bite the hand that funds. Besides, the word was not getting out, for the Church early decided that only qualified people, certain clerics for example, should know the Bible. The Good Book, with its egalitarian laws and morals, its prophetic rebukes of power and exaltation of the humble, invited indiscipline among the faithful and misunderstanding with secular authorities. Only after censorship and edulcoration could it be communicated to the laity. So that it was not until the appearance of such heretical sects as the Waldesians (Waldo, 1175), the Lollards (Wiclif, 1376), Lutherans (1519 on) and Calvinists (mid-sixteenth), with their emphasis on personal religion and the translation of the Bible into the vernacular, that this Judaic-Christian tradition ENTERED EXPLICITLY INTO EUROPEAN POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, BY WAY OF REMINDING RULERS THAT THEY HELD THEIR WEALTH AND POWER OF GOD, AND THEN ON CONDITION OF GOOD BEHAVIOR. AN INCONVENIENT DOCTRINE.

Yet Western medieval Christianity did come to condemn the pretensions of earthly rulers – lesser monarchs, to be sure, that the emperors of Rome (The Eastern Church never talked back to the Caesars of Byzantium). It thereby implicitly gave protection to private property. As the Church’s own claims to power increased, it could not but emphasize the older Judaic principle that the real owner of everything was the Lord above, and the newer Christian principle that the pope was his vicar here below. Earthly rulers were not free to do as they pleased, and even the Church, God’s surrogate on earth, could not flout rights and take at will. The elaborate paperwork that accompanied the transfer of gits of the faithful bore witness to this duty of good practice and proper procedure.

All of this made Europe very different from civilizations around {…]

Ironically, then, Europe’s great good fortune lay in the fall of Rome and the weakness and division that ensued. (So much for the lamentations of generations of classicists and Latin teachers.) The Roman dream of unity, authority, and order (the “pax Romana”) remained, indeed has persisted to the present. After all, one has usually seen fragmentation as a great misfortune, as a recipe for conflict; it is no accident that European union is seen today as the cure for the wars of yesterday. And yet, in those middle years between ancient and modern, fragmentation was the strongest brake on wilful, oppressive behavior. Political rivalry and the right of exit made all the difference.

One other fissure helped: THE SPLIT BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS. UNLIKE ISLAMIC SOCIETIES, WHERE RELIGION WAS IN PRINCIPLE SUPREME AND THE IDEAL GOVERNMENT THAT OF HOLY MEN, Christianity, craving imperial tolerance, early made the distinction between God and Caesar. To each his own. This did not preclude misunderstandings and conflicts: nothing is so unstable as a dual supremacy; something’s got to give. In the end it was the Church, and this meant yielding to Caesar what was Caesar’s and then good part of what was God’s. Among the things that gave, homogeneous orthodoxy: where authority is divided, dissent flourishes. This may be bad for certainty and conformity, but it is surely good for the spirit and popular initiatives.

Here too, fragmentation made all the difference. The Church succeeded in asserting itself politically in some countries, notably those of Southern Europe, not in others; so that there developed within Europe areas of potentially FREE THOUGHT. This FREEDOM FOUND EXPRESSION LATER ON IN THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION, BUT EVEN BEFORE, EUROPE WAS SPARED THE THOUGHT CONTROL THAT PROVED A CURS IN ISLAM.”

In islam, lucrurile stau la fel si azi, ca acum 1400 de ani: nu exista separatie intre religie si stat. In toate statele islamice Coranul este legea fundamentala, tine loc de constitutie, iar toate celelalte legi (aparent) seculare ii sunt subordonate. Se cheama sharia. Asta in caz ca va intrebati de ce musulmanii care vin in Occident, fie acum, fie acum doua, trei generatii, refuza in continuare valorile occidentale, chiar si legile statale. Asa sunt ei crescuti si educati traditional – diametral opus, via islam, respectiv religia lor. Asa sunt incurajati deschis, public, in continuare, de liderii (politici si spirituali) musulmani.

Daca la aceasta lectura (de preferat integrala, fiind remarcabila) adaugati studiul atent, pe indelete, al Bibliei si Coranului, veti intelege de ce cand socialista Mogherini (sefa diplomatiei UE), socialistul Hollande (presedintele Frantei), doamna Merkel (cancelarul chipurile crestin-democrat al Germaniei), premierul britanic Cameron (chipurile crestin conservator), samd, vorbesc de “integrarea” islamului politic (acum, in vara lui 2015) si musulmanilor in civilizatia si cultura europeana, vorbesc prostii si va mint cu iresponsabila nerusinare. Nu se poate.

Ce vor ei inseamna sfarsitul civilizatiei, al exceptionalismului si al acestei istorii DE SUCCES, europene. Idem pt Barack Obama, administratia sa „progresista” si fenomenul America, the land of the free, of life, liberty abd the pursuit of happiness. Ceea ce nu ne surprinde, fiind, in fond, dorinta seculara (deja) a stangii universale: o lume noua, cu Oameni Noi, intemeiata pe moartea lumii vechi, a libertatii individuale si a Omului.

Esecul integrarii musulmane in orice alta cultura si civilizatie, cu atat mai mult in cea occidentala, liberala, democratica si capitalista se datoreaza incompatibilitatii culturale, religioase, principiale.

Continuarea acestor politici “multicultural” iresponsabile (de stanga, da), impotriva evidentei, inseamna continuarea acestui esec, confirmat de istoria ultimelor decade. Avem zeci de milioane de musulmani in Europa, aflati la a doua, a treia generatie, niciodata “integrati” in cultura si civilizatia asta.

Actuala criza a refugiatilor si felul in care liderii occidentali (sau locali) inteleg sa o gestioneze reprezinta doar o etapa din parcursul acestui esec politic, datorat ignorarii sistematice a unor realitati culturale, institutionale si civilizationale fundamentale. Totul cu consecinte incalculabile temporal la acest moment – nu stim in cat timp o asemenea politica va duce la distrugerea ireversibila a culturii si civilizatiei occidentale, de sorginte iudeo-crestina, asa cum o stim: probabil mai repede decat ne asteptam. Dar stim deja ca se va intampla daca vom continua pe linia asta. Negarea acestei realitati (strigatoare la cer) nu o schimba, nici indulceste cu ceva. Doar o neaga – ceea ce, in extremis, devine o problema psihiatrica.

De incheiere, tot impotriva monopolului gandirii (unice, de stanga, da) si impotriva sfarsitului memoriei,  daca tot vorbim de “sfarsitul istoriei” (lucrarea lui Fukuyama, atat de iubita in mediile noastre intelectuale), sa amintim si o alta lucrare remarcabila, Samuel Huntington, The clash of civilizations, 1996. Din prea multe puncte de vedere, analiza si previziunile autorului se verifica in zilele noastre – ceea ce nu se poate spune despre invatacelul sau, Fukuyama.

Si Huntington (1927-2008) tot Harvard , apartinand insa altei generatii, aceeasi cu Landes. Generatii formate academic pe vremea cand gandirea era inca libera, cartea era carte, iar titlul academic titlu academic, nu inginerie politico-sociala.

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